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Position Manipulation Attacks to Balise-Based
Train Automatic Stop Control
Yongdong Wu , Zhuo Wei , Jian Weng , and Robert H. Deng , Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Balise is a popular wayside device to provide accu-
rate location information for subway station parking by sending
telegrams to passing trains. By craftily disturbing wireless signals
of balise telegrams, this paper proposes three attacks that may
make passengers fall and even cause injury. Concretely, the first
attack is to jam telegrams such that balises cannot be detected by
a passing train; the second attack changes the location of trans-
mitting telegrams by jamming and replaying; and the third attack
is to change the total time of transmitting telegrams. All the at-
tacks exploit the train localization mechanism such that a passing
train localizes its position inaccurately and then takes improper
control actions. Furthermore, since these attacks are independent,
they can be launched at the same time to achieve advanced attacks.
As the attacks do not require to tamper with the balises, they can
be launched easily. Our simulations demonstrate the effectiveness
of the proposed attacks. To defeat these attacks, the received tele-
grams need be verified by a train based on fidelity of telegram
data.
Index Terms—Cyber-physical system security, train-ground
communication security, train automatic stop control (TASC),
balise.
I. INTRODUCTION
S INCE 1863, subway system has been a major public trans-port mechanism to transport a large number of passengers
at a high frequency over short distances. For examples, in 2016,
the subway system has a daily ridership of over 3 million pas-
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sengers in Singapore [1]. Due to its high speed, punctuality and
safety merits, subway has been developed rapidly, especially
in the developing countries to meet the requirement of rapid
urbanization.
As train parking on stations is a mandatory train operation
and required to be highly secure and accurate, automatic stop
control techniques are essential in any subway system. If a train
stops suddenly, passengers may fall, get hurt or even die [2].
Conversely, if the train stops very slowly for the sake of safety,
the subway system does not operate efficiently and wastes the
time of passengers. Meanwhile, as passengers choose train cars
to minimize walking distance to exits at destination stations
[3], [4], inaccurate parking positions may cause inconvenience
to passengers, especially on platforms installed with Platform
Screen Doors (PSD) [5], [6]. Hence Train Automatic Stop Con-
trol (TASC) [7] is an indispensable control function in any au-
tomatic subway transport system.
In reality, it is not trivial to meet the parking requirements.
During the process of braking, stopping accuracy of an urban rail
vehicle is affected by at least fifteen uncertainty factors [8] in-
cluding different braking positions and speeds, line conditions,
brake shoe friction coefficients, braking system time delay, brak-
ing control law, basic resistance changes, and random noises. To
handle these uncertain conditions for precise parking, braking
model, remaining distance measurement device and control law
need to be properly designed and employed in TASC.
A braking model reflects the principle and the dynamic char-
acteristics of the braking system including brake shoe friction
coefficient, braking delay, time-varying resistance and unmea-
sured actual traction [9]. In the braking model for control design
and analysis, a train is described as either a single-point mass
rigid object [10] or a multiple-point mass elastics object [11].
As the multiple-point mass train model takes into account the
reaction forces among cars, it is more practical and accurate.
However, its complexity is much higher in order to reflect the
impact of the linear/nonlinear parametric uncertainties. For in-
stance, a seven-car train is described by a total of 84 differential
equations [12], [13]. Therefore, a single-point mass rigid object
is popularly used for TASC design in the academic community.
Remaining distance to the target stop position is the major
input to determine the deceleration in TASC (e.g., [14]). It is
estimated by the moving distance from a reference point. The
moving distance is measured by an on-board positioning de-
vice such as radar detector, photoelectric speed sensors and axle
generators, which are key components of train control systems
[15]. Although the on-board device offers continuous distance
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measurement, its measurement error may increase with the
travel distance. To manage the total measurement error, Eu-
ropean Train Control System (ETCS) SUBSET-041 specifies
the accuracy of on-board distance measurement: “for every
measured distance s the accuracy shall be better or equal to
±(5 + 5%s)” in meters [16]. To correct the error, reference
points are provided along the rail by the wayside devices such as
balises [17]–[20], wireless access points [21] and leaky coaxial
cables [22]–[24]. Although a wayside device is able to transfer
its accurate location information to a passing train via a wire-
less channel [25], it is not used to provide continuous location
information by densely installing wayside devices because it is
expensive. In all, although the accurate reference positioning
devices are of great value for TASC [26], train control systems
using them still fail to get correct continuous remaining distance
for automatic, accurate and comfortable parking. As mixtures
of on-board and wayside devices, range sensors [27] exploit
the radar principle to obtain the accurate position continuously,
while dedicated stopping measurement devices precisely detect
stopping errors based on platform information [28]. However,
these mixture devices need to update the existing infrastructure.
With the braking model and remaining distance, an on-board
train controller will determine the train braking force from
time to time. A straightforward Proportional-Integral-Derivative
(PID) controller is widely used in industrial applications, but it
performs well only in invariant control systems, and hence is
not suitable for a complex system such as train braking sys-
tem. In order to improve the performance of the traditional PID
controller, Model Predictive Control (MPC) technology is in-
corporated with the train models running on Beijing Yizhuang
subway line [29], and a PID variant called as PIQ (Proportional
Integral Quadratic) is proposed to overcome the adverse effect
of actuator delays in the braking system [30]. Besides PID-
like controllers, there are other controllers for TASC such as
machine learning technique for TASC [31], on-line approxima-
tion based robust adaptive controller [32], fuzzy inference [33],
terminal iterative learning controller [34], and neuro-adaptive
fault-tolerant controller [35].
The performance of a TASC controller is tightly related to
the accuracy of the remaining distance. An inaccurate remain-
ing distance will significantly degrade the parking accuracy and
comfortability. To tolerate the distance errors, the existing TASC
controllers employ the knowledge of train operation environ-
ment and historic data to reduce the uncertainties. However, all
of them only concern the accidental distance errors, but ignore
technical and malicious attacks, such as telegram jamming and
tampering with the location messages in telegrams. In compari-
son with non-technical attacks such as the suicide bomber attack
in Moscow subway [36], technical attacks are stealthy, which
protect the attackers from being traced, arrested and punished
by governments and international societies.
This paper presents three stealth attacks which aim to cre-
ate erroneous remaining distance such that the train can not
park properly. Every attack exploits the security vulnerabilities
of the wireless channel between on-board device and wayside
device. Specifically, the remaining distance is maliciously ma-
nipulated by jamming balise-train wireless channel, replaying
Fig. 1. TASC model based on balise information.
balise telegrams, and/or change the total time of the telegram
transmission. As a result, the on-board controller generates an
improper deceleration profile such that passengers can not align
on platforms properly. Our simulations show that the attacks
can be easily and effectively launched with only very short-time
interference signals. To defeat the attacks, four countermeasures
are presented to ensure the soundness of the received telegrams.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the preliminaries for subway parking systems.
Section III presents a train automatic stop controller. Section IV
presents the attacks for train parking. Section V analyzes the
attack feasibility, parameter sensibility, and their countermea-
sures. Section VI shows the results of attack simulations using a
real subway line configuration as an example. Section VII draws
conclusions.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section introduces the TASC model and its components
including wayside positioning device, and balise-based train
positioning mechanism.
A. TASC Model
As shown in Fig. 1, a TASC model consists of sensor, balise,
and controller. An on-board sensor, such as wheel angular speed
sensor, Doppler radar, accelerometer, and gyroscope, measures
the train moving distance d, speed v and acceleration a in a real-
time manner; and a balise is a wayside device which provides the
passing train an accurate location as a distance maker [37] for
correcting possible sensor measurement errors, and setting the
target distance to the destination station. As the measurement
error from an on-board sensor accumulates over time, several
balises near the destination station are usually installed to reduce
the total measured moving distance error and/or the remaining
distance error. With the input from sensors and balises, the con-
troller continuously decides the remaining distance to the des-
tination station, and calculates the parking acceleration/speed
profile such that the actuator can brake the train for comfort
travel experience and precise parking location.
Usually, a balise-based TASC works as follows. When the
train passes over the first balise that shows the start point of
the fixed positional stop control, the train controller begins to
run the parking control law to calculate the deceleration profile
for desired stop smoothness and accuracy, and then apply the
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Fig. 2. The same telegram received at different positions pi , i = 1, 2, . . . , l. At position p0, the balise is activated to send the telegram. Note that all the pi are
unknown to the train. p is the actual balise position which can be extracted from the telegram and p˜ is the estimated train position at the estimated time t˜.
brake to stop at the desired location of the target station [14],
[33], [38]. As long as a new balise is passed over, the moving
distance d will be reset to 0 to prevent the error accumulation,
and then the deceleration profile will be updated with the new
balise information.
B. Wayside Positioning Device
A balise is a wayside device placed between the rails of a rail-
way, serving as a beacon giving traffic information (e.g., location
of the balise, curve and gradient of the rail, and speed restric-
tion) to any train passing over it. Balise Transmission Module
(BTM) is an on-board module for intermittent transmission be-
tween balise and train controller. Considering balise’s crucial
role in safety and train operation, ETCS SUBSET-036 has de-
tailed specifications [17] on balise telegram in terms of structure,
type, and physical format in order to serve as a solid basis for the
interoperability with any ETCS compliant on-board equipment.
The balise telegram is either 341-bit “short telegram” or
1023-bit “long telegram” including 75 parity bits for parity-
checking. It is transmitted to the train in the form of binary
FSK (Frequency-Shift Keying) with a 4.23 MHz center fre-
quency. A ‘0’-bit corresponds to approximately 7 periods of
3.951 MHz, while a ‘1’-bit corresponds to approximately 8 pe-
riods of 4.516 MHz. Denote the waveform signal received by a
BTM as u(t), the BTM calculates a bit
ρ˜ =
{
0 u(t) ∗ f0(t) > u(t) ∗ f1(t)
1 otherwise
(1)
where ‘∗’ is the detector, and f0(t) (or f1(t)) is a match filter
with frequency 3.951 MHz (4.516 MHz resp.).
Although IAGO (Informatisation et Automatisation par
Guide d’Onde) waveguide is installed in some subway lines
(e.g., Singapore Northeast Line [39]), it is not as popular as
balise, most likely because they are more costly, require more
effort for installation, and (when used outdoors) may be more
susceptible to signal degradation due to rain/snow/ice accumu-
lation [40]. Hence, without loss of generality, balise is used to
represent wayside positioning devices in the following.
C. Balise-Based Train Positioning
Usually, when a train passes over a balise, its BTM emits
electromagnet wave to power the balise. For instance, with a 20
W on-board antenna, a BTM emits a continuous electromagnetic
wave at frequency 27.095 MHz (±5 kHz) to power a balise up
to a distance of 60 cm [41]. With reference to Fig. 3, the balise
induced voltage is variable with the distance between BTM and
Fig. 3. Balise induced voltage vs Balise-BTM distance (adapted from [18]).
If and only if the induced voltage is above a threshold value, the balise is able
to send the telegram to BTM. The actual effect range R varies with the balise,
BTM and train speed.
balise center point. If the induced voltage becomes higher than
a threshold value Vth (e.g., 3.3 V), the balise is activated to
send the telegram to the train, and will transmit the telegram
repeatedly as long as the induced voltage is higher than Vth .
Therefore, the moving train may receive a multiple of telegram
copies at different positions as shown in Fig. 2.
Denote the balise transmission time as effective time T , the
train moving distance within T as effective range R, the total
length of the telegram as L and telegram bitrate as br , the number
of received copies is
l = T × br
L
 = R× br
Lv
 (2)
for a train moving at a constant speed v within the effective
range. Rewriting (2) as
R =
Lvl
br
+ δ, 0 ≤ δ < Lv
br
(3)
Due to the symmetry of induced voltage shown in Fig. 3, the
actual balise position
p = p0 +
R
2
= p0 +
Lvl
2br
+
δ
2
(4)
where p0 is the unknown position where the balise is activated.
Denote ti as the time when the train receives the ith copy
of the telegram. After extracting the balise position p from the
telegram, the train needs to know when it passes over the balise.
A naı¨ve method is to choose the middle time t l2  as the balise
passage time. As it is certain that the train velocity is variable
in the parking process, a better solution is to estimate the balise
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Fig. 4. Control procedure of TASC [31].
passage time
t˜ =
∑l
i=1 ti
l
(5)
In other words, the controller estimates that the train passed
over the balise at time t˜. In fact, with reference to Fig. 2, the
train position at time t˜ is
p˜ =
∑l
i=1 pi
l
=
∑l
i=1(p0 + iL/br × v + εi)
l
≈ p0 + Lv
∑l
i=1 i
lbr
= p0 +
Lv
lbr
× l(l + 1)
2
= p0 +
Lv(l + 1)
2br
(6)
where the random variable εi is the error of the estimated posi-
tion pi . Thus the error of the estimated balise position is
e = p˜− p ≈
(
p0 +
Lv(l + 1)
2br
)
−
(
p0 +
Lvl
2br
+
δ
2
)
=
Lv
2br
− δ
2
∈
(
0, Lv
2br
]
(7)
With reference to (7), the train location error is bounded
to a small value when the balise passage time is estimated as t˜
assuming the effective range is symmetric with balise center. For
instance, according to the introduction of balise in Section II-B,
assume the length L of balise telegram be 341 in bits, and
the train speed be 10 m/s. According to the average data rate
br = 564.48 kbps [17], the error e in (7) is no more than Lv2br =
341×10
2×564.48×103 ≈ 3 × 10−3 meters.
However, if the symmetry assumption does not hold, e.g.,
either the balise activation time or the effective range is manip-
ulated, there may be significant difference between the estimated
train position and the balise position at time t˜. This difference
will be exploited in Section IV-D below by an attacker.
III. TRAIN AUTOMATIC STOP CONTROL
With the measured travel speed v, acceleration a, moving
distance d, and remaining distance to destination platform ad-
dressed in Section II, the on-board controller will calculate
the braking force profile so as to stop the train accurately and
comfortably.
A. System Model
With regard to Fig. 4, suppose there are n balise Bi near the
target platform. Bn is localized at the stop position. Denote Si
as the distance between balise Bi and the target stop position,
Fig. 5. TASC control diagram with Smith predictor H (s)(1 + e−λs ).
and Di as the distance between balises Bi and Bi+1. Obviously
Sn = 0. All the Si and Di are extracted by the train from the
telegram sent from balise Bi , and Si − Si+1 = Di . Let vi (or ai)
be the train’s speed (acceleration respectively) at balise Bi . We
further assume that the train moves at a constant speed before it
passes over the first balise B1, i.e., a1 = 0.
This paper will adopt the single-point mass model for investi-
gating the train performance due to its popularity and simplicity
[42], [43]. Therefore, if the train with mass M is expected to
run at a constant deceleration from balise Bi , we have
Maidi =
1
2
Mv2 − 1
2
Mvi
2 (8)
based on the relationship between work and train kinetic energy.
Rewriting (8) as
v2 = vi2 + 2aidi (9)
Suppose the train stops accurately, vn = 0 and moving dis-
tance di = Si , the expect deceleration
ai = − vi
2
2Si
(10)
Hence, after passing any new balise, the train controller shall
re-calculate the expect deceleration and adjust the actuator.
Equation (10) describes the train stop principle in an ideal
condition, e.g., the acceleration can be changed immediately
after the actuator is driven. Nonetheless, as the acceleration
an = − (vn −1)
2
Dn −1

= 0 at the last balise Bn according to (10), the
train does not stop comfortably. Therefore, a practical TASC
shall complete the distance Dn−1 by continuously adjusting the
expect deceleration based on the on-board measured remaining
distance.
B. Controller Diagram
Any practical train control system shall handle the uncertain-
ties such as system delay and resistance. In this paper, we adopt
the Heuristic Online Learning Algorithm (HOA) [31] as it is
used in a real subway.
Fig. 5 illustrates our TASC diagram, where the Smith predic-
tor is used to compensate the pure system delay, the forward
controller C(s) is used to generate the braking force, and the
transfer function
G(s)e−τ s =
y(s)
u(s)
=
a0
1 + qs
e−τ s (11)
WU et al.: POSITION MANIPULATION ATTACKS TO BALISE-BASED TRAIN AUTOMATIC STOP CONTROL 5291
is the braking model [31], where a0 is the braking performance
gain, τ and q represent the time delay and the time constant of
the braking system. Assume Smith predictor is employed with
estimated braking model H(s) and estimated delay λ, we have⎧⎨
⎩
x = r − (a + uH(1 − e−λs))
u = xC
a = y − f = uGe−τ s − f
(12)
where r is the reference signal for the deceleration so that the
actual acceleration can be close to ai in (10). In (12), we denote
C(s), G(s) and H(s) as C,G, and H respectively for the sake of
simplicity. According to [31], the basic resistance acceleration
can be modeled as f = αv2 + βv + γ for some constants α, β,
and γ. By simplifying (12), we have the actual train acceleration
function
a =
rCGe−τ s − f(1 + CH − CHe−λs)
1 + C(H −He−λs + Ge−τ s) (13)
If Smith predictor is ideally chosen, the estimated delay λ =
τ and the estimated braking model H = G, then (13) can be
rewritten as
a =
rCGe−τ s − f(1 + CG− CGe−τ s)
1 + CG
(14)
As there is no delay factor in the denominator of (14), the delay
has no effect on the stability of the whole train system accord-
ing to control theory. In this case, Smith predictor completely
compensates the adverse effect of delay.
C. Reference Signal
According to (13), if the forward controller C(s) is designed
to ensure the actual acceleration a approaches to the reference
signal r gradually, r can be close to the expected deceleration
in (10). But in fact, the actual deceleration a is not always
equal to the reference signal r due to the delay and/or inertia
in the forward transfer function C(s)G(s)e−τ s , hence the train
may stop away from balise Bn . Meanwhile, if r = ai is used to
update the braking force directly with the new acceleration ai
when the train passes over balise Bi , the change of the actual
train acceleration may be too large such that the passengers do
not feel well. To provide an accurate and comfort parking, the
relationship between the expect deceleration ai in (10) and the
reference signal r in (13) is represented with a transfer function
Q(s) =
r(s)
ai(s)
=
k
1 + hs
(15)
with gain k for adjusting stop location and inertia coefficient
h for reducing jerk rate, when the train moves between two
neighboring balises.
IV. THE PRESENT ATTACKS
As introduced in Section III, a TASC aims to provide good
stop performance in terms of accuracy and comfortability.
Specifically, due to the physical limitation of train platform,
especially for the platform installed with PSD, the train shall
stop at an accurate position in a passenger-friendly way. For
instance, regulation for precise stopping of the urban train re-
quires 0.3 m in Korea [28] and 0.3 m∼ 0.5 m in China [30].
Meanwhile, in order to operate the train smoothly, the changing
rate of acceleration, called as jerk rate designed into the auto-
matic train operation [42], shall be restricted. For instance, the
jerk rate is limited to be 0.75 m/s3 in the commercial subway
system [44].
On the contrary, an attacker aims to make the train stop at
a wrong place or a high jerk rate. Indeed, both wrong place or
high jerk rate motivations are correlated. For instance, if a train
passes over balise Bn , an emergency brake shall take effect such
that the train has a high jerk rate. Thus, the following Sections
elaborate the attacks which incur erroneous parking positions
only.
A. Security Model
According to the balise specification [17], the telegram trans-
mission process does not include any security protection mech-
anism. Therefore, it is easy for an attacker to generate a bogus
telegram [45], [46] to cheat the train such that the parking posi-
tion is incorrect, or even does not stop on the target station. As
the bogus telegram attack is very simple, and can be defeated
with cryptographic tools, this paper will ignore this attack in the
following.
As the IT subsystems of the train system are private, it is not
easy for an attacker to break into them. However, the train-
ground communication channel, especially the BTM-balise
channel is open to public. To violate the parking requirements,
the attacker may manipulate the telegram or balise electromag-
net signals such that the train parks at an inaccurate position. To
this end, the attacker is assumed to be
 Able to jam the balise signals due to the public accessibility
of the wireless BTM-balise communication. Theoretical
analysis, simulation and practical events in subway envi-
ronments demonstrate the possibility of the interference of
wireless communication [47], [48];
 Able to replay the balise telegrams because the telegram
information is accessible to any one; but
 Unable to tamper with the wayside devices and on-board
devices.
B. Balise Missing Attack
According to (10), the remaining distance Si extracted from
a balise telegram is used to update the expected acceleration in
TASC when the train passes over balise Bi . But if a telegram is
missing, the update process will be omitted such that the train
parks in an unusual manner.
To cause balise missing, an attacker can jam the BTM-balise
gap when a train passes over a balise by transmitting signals to
BTM antenna at the same frequency band as the balise trans-
mits [49]. As introduced in Section II-B, the telegram format
and frequency band are public, hence the adversary can start the
selective and intelligent interfering to block the balise transmis-
sion so as to be energy-efficient.
Fig. 6 illustrates the attack workflow. When a train passes
over a balise, the attacker jams a crafted signal ua(t) to the
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Fig. 6. Balise missing attack diagram.
TABLE I
BALISE MISSING ATTACK STRATEGY
message bit ρ Telegram waveform ub Jamming waveform ua
0 7 periods of 3.951 MHz 8 periods of 4.516 MHz
1 8 periods of 4.516 MHz 7 periods of 3.951 MHz
BTM antenna. Upon receiving the electromagnetic waveform
u(t), BTM decodes the waveform with two match filers so as to
determine the binary bit based on (1).
Table I shows the jamming waveforms for different message
bits. For any target telegram binary bit ρ in column 1, the genuine
balise will emit the waveform as column 2. However, the attacker
will simultaneously transmit a complementary bit (1 − ρ) to
BTM as indicated in column 3. For instance, as shown in row 2,
given a message bit ρ = 0, the genuine balise will transmit
approximately 7 periods of 3.951 MHz, but the attacker will
transmit approximately 8 periods of 4.516 MHz at the same
time.
When the signal u(t) = ub(t) + ua(t) + n(t) is received by
BTM, where ub(t) is the component sent from the genuine
balise, ua(t) is sent from the attacker, and n(t) is random noise
in air-gap channel. Upon receiving the signal u(t), the on-board
device calculates the correlation
ρ0 = u(t) ∗ f0(t) = (ub(t) + ua(t) + n(t)) ∗ f0(t)
= ub(t) ∗ f0(t) (16)
where the last equality “=” holds due to independencies among
filter f0(t), jamming signal ua(t) and random noise n(t).
Similarly
ρ1 = u(t) ∗ f1(t) = (ub(t) + ua(t) + n(t)) ∗ f1(t)
= ua(t) ∗ f1(t) (17)
If the power of the jamming signal ua(t) is higher than the
power of the genuine signal ub(t), then ρ0 < ρ1 with a high
probability. As a result, according to the detection formula (1),
ρ˜ = 1 
= ρ. It is easy to verify that the on-board device will make
mistake for message ρ = 1 too. According to the 75 parity bits
in the balise telegram [17], the on-board device will reject the
telegram erroneously if the parity-check fails, and hence miss
to update the expected acceleration in (15) as shown in Fig. 7.
Let’s show this balise missing attack using an extreme case
that the attacker is able to disrupt all the balises except the first
Fig. 7. Balise missing attack. ”X” means that the data is unknown to the
passing train.
Fig. 8. Attack by displacing balise away from the destination station, where
D˜i (Di ) indicates the manipulated (original) distance, “X” means that the balise
is missing.
Fig. 9. Attack by displacing balise towards the destination station.
one B1. Suppose that the actual accelerate error is 0.1m/s2 on
average due to unpredictable weather reasons, and the parking
process takes 10 seconds. Because there is no balise update in
the parking process due to balise missing attack, the parking
location error is approximately 1/2 × 0.1 × 102 = 5 meters !
The balise missing attack can be detected by the on-board
device if the train has the rail map which includes the balises’
positions. With this detection, the train service quality will only
degrade a little bit when the train moves slowly. Hence an at-
tacker may prefer to stealth attacks to have better attack effect
as elaborated in the following.
C. Balise Displacement Attack
In balise specification [17], the telegram transmission mecha-
nism does not include the challenge-response security protection
mechanism, thus, the attacker is able to replay the balise tele-
gram such that the victim balise seems to be displaced around
its actual position. To realize this attack, the adversary shall jam
the genuine balise as Section IV-B introduces, and replay the
telegram of the balise. Considering the attack starts before or
after the train passage, there are two balise displacement attacks.
With regard to Fig. 8, a balise Bi (B2 is used as an example
in Fig. 8) is virtually moved toward balise Bi−1, the actual
moving distance between Bi−1 and Bi becomes shorter. Thus,
the acceleration update algorithm will be executed ahead of
schedule.
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On the contrary, with regard to Fig. 9, a balise Bi is virtually
moved toward balise Bi+1, the actual moving distance between
Bi−1 and Bi becomes longer. Thus, the acceleration update al-
gorithm will be executed behind schedule.
Denote the balise Bi is displaced at a distance θ. According
to (10), the train speed at the faked balise position is
v˜2i = vi−1
2 + 2ai−1D˜i−1 = vi−12 + 2ai−1(Di−1 + θ) (18)
and according to (10), we have
ai−1 = − vi−1
2
2Si−1
(19)
a˜i = − v˜
2
i
2Si
(20)
Therefore, the train speed at balise Bi+1 is
v˜2i+1 = v˜
2
i + 2a˜iD˜i = v˜2i + 2a˜i(Di − θ)
= v˜2i −
v˜2i
Si
(Di − θ) = v˜2i ×
Si −Di + θ
Si
=
(
vi−12 + 2ai−1(Di−1 + θ)
)× Si+1 + θ
Si
=
(
vi−12 − vi−1
2
Si−1
(Di−1 + θ)
)
× Si+1 + θ
Si
= vi−12 × Si − θ
Si−1
× Si+1 + θ
Si
(21)
That is
v˜i+1 = vi−1 ×
√
Si − θ
Si−1
× Si+1 + θ
Si
(22)
If there is no displacement attack, i.e., θ = 0, then
vi+1 = vi−1 ×
√
Si
Si−1
× Si+1
Si
= vi−1 ×
√
Si+1
Si−1
(23)
Thus the change of entry speed at balise Bi+1 due to displace-
ment attack is
Δi+1 = v˜i+1 − vi+1
= vi−1
(√
Si − θ
Si−1
× Si+1 + θ
Si
−
√
Si+1
Si−1
)
(24)
It indicates that the change Δi+1 is a function of displacement θ
as shown in Fig. 10. That is to say, after receiving the telegram
from the displaced balise, the train re-calculates the parking
profile with an incorrect speed and position. Therefore, parking
process will be not satisfactory.
D. Transmission Time Extension Attack
With reference to Section II-C, if the attacker extends the
induced power time and/or replays the telegrams, the number l
of telegrams transmitted will increase and result in the erroneous
balise position. For instance, after the normal balise telegrams
complete as shown in Fig. 11, the attacker continues to telepower
the balise or directly replay the telegram such that m more
Fig. 10. Displacement effect on the speed change Δ3 when balise B2 is
attacked, where v1 = 10 m/s, S1= 100 m, S2 = 64 m, and S3= 36 m.
telegrams are received by the train. Then, with reference to (6),
the estimated train position is
p˜ = p0 +
Lv(l + m + 1)
2br
(25)
Thus the estimation error is
e = p˜− p ≈
(
p0 +
Lv(l + m + 1)
2br
)
−
(
p0 +
Lvl
2br
+
δ
2
)
=
Lv(m + 1)
2br
− δ
2
=
m
2l
· Lvl
br
+
(
Lv
2br
− δ
2
)
=
m
2l
·R− m
2l
· δ +
(
Lv
2br
− δ
2
)
≈ m
2l
·R (26)
According to [18], R is estimated to be 0.75 m for some BTM-
balise pair. In other words, the error of park location will be
0.375 m as long as the attacker merely re-transmits the telegram
or continuously powers the balise such that m = l. If so, the
attack takes lLvbr seconds.
Alternatively, if the effective range R is unknown but the train
speed is known, with reference to Fig. 11, the position error can
be obtain as
e ≈ 1
2
∫ tn + m
t0
vdt− 1
2
∫ tn
t0
vdt =
1
2
∫ tn + m
tn
vdt (27)
where v(t) is the train speed function, t0 is the time when the
balise starts to send telegram, and tn (or tn+m ) is the time when
the nth (or (n + m)th resp.) telegram is received by the train.
Similarly, the attacker can send the telegram ahead of p0 as
shown in Fig. 12. In this attack, if the effective range R is known,
the position error is
e = p˜− p ≈ −mLv
2br
≈ −m
2l
×R (28)
otherwise
e = p˜− p ≈ 1
2
∫ tn
t−m
vdt− 1
2
∫ tn
t0
vdt =
1
2
∫ t0
t−m
vdt (29)
if the train speed function is known.
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Fig. 11. Displacement attack after balise passage.
Fig. 12. Displacement attack before balise passage.
Fig. 13. Roadside attack (Adapted from [50]). The arrow indicates the poten-
tial attack direction.
V. DISCUSSIONS
A. Feasibility of Attacks
Although the subway operators regard safety and security as
the first priority in train services and take much effort in guarding
subway, subway is still an “ideal” target of the attacker because
a successful attack to subway will severely ruin the reputation
of the railway operator and its authority. Meanwhile, the present
attacks are technically feasible in several aspects.
First, as a telegram transmitter is very small and lightweight, it
can be installed on any vehicle, or even put into a small handhold
bag. Therefore, the attacks are stealthy such that the attackers
have much lower risk than non-technical attackers (e.g., bomb
attacker). In addition, a small attack tool enables the attacker to
choose the target balise flexibly and launch the attack quickly.
Secondly, as the train car is made of metal, an attacker is
unable to emit the interference signal on the train due to the
effect of Faraday cage. Nonetheless, in some train services as
shown in Fig. 13, the BTM-balise gap is more than 0.5 m, and is
Fig. 14. Attack beneath the bridge. In the two-layer public transport system,
the train moves above the ground, and buses moves on the ground. The arrow
indicates the potential attack direction.
open to anyone. Therefore, a trackside attacker is able to easily
inject signals to this kind of train services.
Thirdly, as shown in Fig. 14, some balises are installed on
the bridges (or above the ground), the attacker may emit attack
signals under the bridge. In this case, the attack success prob-
ability is related to the bridge material, interference frequency,
interference antenna and interference signal power. To the best
of our knowledge, there is no real result on the penetration of
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TABLE II
COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT ATTACKS
Attack
method
Attack
action
Attack
time
Attack EM
signal
Reference
error
Balise
missing
interfere T high energy unknown
Balise
displacement
interfere &
replay
(T, 2T ] high energy &
more time
displacement
Time
extension
replay variable more time 0.5v¯ · Tattack
4.23 MHz radio wave on metal-reinforced concrete structure
which is used to build rail bridges. Thus we can not estimate the
attack success probability directly. However, we can evaluate
the attack feasibility as follows. In the experiments [51], con-
ventional WiFi signal (Omni-directional antenna, 2400 MHz)
can penetrate a 0.45 m metal-reinforced concrete structure. As
the depth of radio penetration is inversely proportional to the
square root of the frequency [52], [53], the penetration depth
of the attack frequency (4.23 MHz) is roughly
√
2400
4.23 = 23.8
times as high as that of WiFi frequency (2400 MHz). Moreover,
if the attacker emits higher-energy electromagnetic signals with
a directional antenna, the penetration effect will be increased
significantly. Thus, the attack beneath the bridge is feasible.
B. Comparison of Attacks
The attacks elaborated in Section IV have different require-
ments on the interference means, time and power, and may have
different attack effects. Table II shows the comparison results
of the proposed attacks listed in column 1.
The second column shows which attack action is taken by the
adversary, where the original telegram signals are interfered in
balise missing attack, replayed in time extension attack, inter-
fered and replayed in the displacement attack. Thus, replacement
attack is more complicated than others.
The third column presents the attack time required. In the
missing attack, the attacker has to jam the BTM-balise gap
within the BTM-balise communication time period, hence the
attack time is almost the same as the telegram transmission time
T . In the displacement attack, the attacker has to replay the balise
telegram and jam the original balise signal to cause erroneous
telegrams, hence, the attack time is within the interval (T, 2T ].
In the time extension attack, the attacker will replay a telegram
continuously such that the train obtains the balise position with
sufficiently large error. Therefore, his attack time varies with the
train speed.
In the fourth column, both missing attack and displacement
attack require higher EM (Electro-Magnetic) energy according
to (16) and (17) to jam the genuine balise. In addition, the
displacement attack requires extra attack time to replay the tele-
gram. In the time extension attack, the time for emitting the
attack signal is longer than the time for transmitting normal
BTM-balise telegram.
The last column shows the reference distance errors which are
the attack results. Here reference distance is the value di in (9)
when a parking profile is updated. In balise missing attack, the
Fig. 15. The BTM-balise authenticated communication protocol.
process for parking profile update is missed and the reference
distance is unknown to the train. The reference distance error
due to displacement attack is the displacement, and the reference
distance error is about 0.5v¯ · Tattack, where v¯ is the average speed
within the attack period Tattack. Thus, both displacement attack
and time extension attack are flexible from the viewpoint of the
attackers.
C. Countermeasures
The above attacks exploit the fidelity vulnerabilities of the
balise telegram such that the train obtains an erroneous balise
location data at the balise passage time. In order to defeat
these attacks, the train shall check the fidelity of the received
balise telegrams using the following methods.
1) Cryptographic Protocol: The first method is to authen-
ticate the telegrams with an interactive cryptographic proto-
col between on-board device and balise. This countermeasure
is able to thwart the replay attacks including displacement at-
tack and time extension attack. Specifically, with reference to
Fig. 15, suppose both on-board BTM and balise share a key
key (or each side has an authentic public/private key pair).
Whenever a train passes over a balise which can produce tele-
grams, the balise presents a telegram including telegram content
M1, its timestamp T1 and MAC (Message Authentication Code)
MAC1 = H(M1||T1||key) to the train BTM, where H(·) is a
one-way function, and x||y is the concatenation of string x and
string y. Afterwards, the train checks the authenticity of the
balise and timestamp. Optionally, the train can reply with a tele-
gram including message M2, its timestamp T2 and the MAC
MAC2 = H(M2||T2||key) to the balise, such that the balise is
able to verify the messages from the train (if any).
This protocol is a trivial/standard application of cryptographic
primitives, hence it guarantees to defeat faking attack and replay
attack. However, its implementation is not trivial as it shall be
compliant with the balise specification on telegrams [17], [54].
Balise telegram consists of packet types which are strictly
defined in the specifications, especially for the uplink telegrams
sent from balise to train. Hence, the telegram in the above pro-
tocol shall follow the specifications, otherwise, it may be dan-
gerous due to incompatible format. To this end, we customize
the telegram packet type 72 which is used to send text mes-
sages from balise to driver-machine interface via BTM. Table III
shows the customized data structure of packet type 72 for the
above protocol.
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TABLE III
AUTHENTIC UPLINK TELEGRAM
Variable/field Length Comment value
NID_PACKET 8 packet type 72
Q_DIR 2 direction x
L_PACKET 13 packet length x
Q_SCALE 2 scale 2
Q_TEXTCLASS 2 class 0
Q_TEXTDISPLAY 1 event relation 1
D_TEXTDISPLAY 15 start event 32766
M_MODETEXTDISPLAY 4 start event 0
M_LEVELTEXTDISPLAY 3 start event 4
L_TEXTDISPLAY 15 end event 0
T_TEXTDISPLAY 10 end event 0
M_MODETEXTDISPLAY 4 end event x
M_LEVELTEXTDISPLAY 3 end event x
Q_TEXTCONFIRM 2 confirmation 0
L_TEXT 8 text length |M|
X_TEXT x text M
In the Table III, the first column is the variable or field in
packet type 72, the second column is the length of the field in
bits, the third column is the meaning of the field. The first three
columns are specified in the balise specification [54], and the
last column is the value chosen for the above protocol, where
‘x’ means that the value depends on usage case. Let’s explain
the customized fields one by one.
Q_TEXTCLASS field specifies whether the message is aux-
iliary or important for rendering to the driver. As the protocol
message is only useful to the on-board computer, hence, its class
can be auxiliary information (i.e., Q_TEXTCLASSb=0).
In order to render the telegram text in a controllable manner,
the balise specification defines five kinds of events which are
the conditions to render the texts. Q_TEXTDISPLAY field is
used to decide whether any or all of relevant events shall occur
for text rendering. For the sake of driver-friendly, safety and
reliability, we choose Q_TEXTDISPLAY=1 which requires to
fulfill all the following events:
1) D_TEXTDISPLAY indicates the distance from where on
the text shall be displayed. The distance is in the interval
(0, 327660) meters. As we do not want to render the
telegram text to the driver, we choose the maximum value,
i.e., D_TEXTDISPLAY = 32766 and the scale Q_SCALE
= 2 for 10-meter scale.
2) M_MODETEXTDISPLAY indicates the on-board op-
erating mode for rendering the text. In the full su-
pervision mode, the driver will not be interfered with.
Hence, the start event M_MODETEXTDISPLAY =
0 (i.e., full supervision mode), and the end event
M_MODETEXTDISPLAY shall be chosen as the present
mode (i.e., no mode change).
3) M_LEVELTEXTDISPLAY indicates on-board operating
level for text display. As the probability of the highest
level is low, the start event M_LEVELTEXTDISPLAY =
4, and the end event M_MODETEXTDISPLAY shall the
same as the present level in order to avoid the interference
on the train operation.
4) L_TEXTDISPLAY shows how far the message shall be
displayed. As we do not want to render the text message
on the driver-machine interface, we choose the minimal
distance, i.e., L_TEXTDISPLAY=0.
5) T_TEXTDISPLAY shows how long the message shall
be displayed. We choose T_TEXTDISPLAY=0 which
indicates the display time is 0 (i.e., the text disappears
from the driver’s screen soon after it is rendered).
The field Q_TEXTCONFIRM=0 means that the driver is not
required to confirm text messages. Finally, L_TEXT is the length
of telegram message M = {M1, T1,MAC1} and X_TEXT is
the message M.
2) Cross-Checking With On-Board Devices: The second
countermeasure is to detect the attacks by the trains. As a balise
only provides its discrete physical position rather than the train’s
real-time position, almost all Automatic Train Protection (ATP)
systems have the on-board continuous speed/location measure-
ment devices. Although the on-board measurements are inac-
curate, their errors are usually restricted to a small range. For
instance, when a train receives telegrams from two consecutive
balises, it is able to calculate the distance d˜ of the balises from
the telegrams. Suppose the error of the qualified on-board dis-
tance sensor is no more than 5 + 5%s˜ for the measured travel
distance s˜ [16], then
|d˜− s˜| < 5 + 5%s˜, i.e., d˜ ∈ (0.95s˜− 5, 1.05s˜ + 5). (30)
The train is able to detect the displacement attack and/or time
extension attack if (30) does not hold.
It is also easy to detect the balise missing attack if the train
schedule/map indicates the balise distance d˜ or each balise tele-
gram includes its distance d˜ to the next balise. Specifically, after
passing over a balise, the train expects to meet the next balise
after traveling s˜ ∈ ( d˜−51.05 , d˜+50.95 ). Therefore, the train knows that it
misses a balise if it does not detect an expected balise after trav-
eling d˜+50.95 . Once the attacks are found, the train usually moves
slowly for safety reasons and reports to the control centers.
With reference to Table II, the telegram transmission time
shall be within a suitable interval for a given train speed. Hence,
if the transmission time of a balise telegram is beyond the inter-
val, the train may detect the potential attacks and then defeat it
by moving cautiously.
3) Non-EM Balise: The third countermeasure is that the
train actively reads “balise” data via non-electromagnetic meth-
ods. For example, based on computer vision technology [55]–
[57], the train takes pictures of the barcode (or QR code) at the
balise position and then extracts the balise position information,
or takes pictures of the rails and then counts the number of sleep-
ers for continuous positioning. As this AI-based countermeasure
completely removes the weakness of electromagnetic commu-
nication in noise tolerance, it defeats all the present attacks.
However, its performance is restricted by rain, snow, environ-
ment brightness etc.
4) Anti-Jamming: There are many research works on wire-
less jamming and anti-jamming [58]. Hence, the fourth counter-
measure is to adopt the well-known anti-jamming technologies,
such as dynamic telegram waveform format or frequency such
as frequency-hopping [59]. As the attacker can not predict the
telegram waveform, he fails to jam the signal such that all the
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attacks fail. Nonetheless, this countermeasure is not compatible
with ETCS standards. Moreover, as the first countermeasure,
this countermeasure has to spend much effort on the crypto-
graphic key management so as to synchronize the keys of BTM
and balise. If the keys are not properly managed, the security
strength may not be guaranteed and/or the BTM-balise commu-
nication may fail.
Each of the above countermeasures has its strength and weak-
ness, and they are complementary to each other. In order to have
the best defence effect, their combination is preferable.
VI. SIMULATIONS
This section describes a simulation configuration with a real
subway system and the performance of the present attacks on
the subway system.
A. Configuration
In order to facilitate the accurate and comfortable station
parking, balises are installed near each station. As a balise is
expensive, only a small number of balise is installed in practice
so as to make trade-off between cost and stop accuracy. In
this simulation, we adopt the same parameters as [31], [60],
i.e., the stop area has 6 balises which are localized at positions
S1 = 100 m, S2 = 64 m, S3 = 36 m, S4 = 16 m, S5 = 4 m,
and S6 = 0 m. In addition, the maximum velocity for a train
to enter into the stop area is vmax = 11.5 m/s, the maximum
actual deceleration amax = −1 m/s2. Meanwhile, the braking
deceleration model is G(s)e−0.6s = e−0.6s/(1 + 0.4s) and the
resistance factor f = 10−4 × (1.36v2 + 145v + 1244).
As addressed in Section III, PID controller with Smith pre-
dictor is used to control the parking process. The PID con-
troller is C(s) = 7 + 2/s + 0.1s and the Smith predictor per-
fectly matches the braking deceleration model, i.e., the Smith
predictor is G(s)(1 − e−0.6s). In order to patch up the delay and
inertia mentioned in Section III, an empirical adjustment scalar
array k = {1.46, 1.30, 1.11, 1.02, 1.0} is used for balises B1 to
B5 respectively, and the decay rate h = 0.7 for restricting the
jerk rate in (15). In addition, when the train speed is 0.05 m/s,
the train is forced to stop immediately.
The parking curves in Fig. 16 indicate the TASC has satisfac-
tory merits in terms of small jerk rate, admissible deceleration
and accurate parking position. Hence, the system configura-
tion makes sense. In the following sections, we will show that
the attacker can invalidate the parking process with the present
attacks.
B. Balise Missing Attack
To demonstrate the effectiveness of balise missing attack,
the attacker will jam one balise such that the train misses its
telegram information. In this case, the train will continue to run
with the current control process after passing over the missing
balise. Fig. 17 shows the parking error when a balise at different
position is missed. It indicates that the parking error may be
more than 2 meters in case of one balise missing, far beyond
the allowable error 0.3 m in China and Korea. Especially, when
Fig. 16. TASC simulation with the parameters in [60].
Fig. 17. Parking errors due to different balise missing.
balise B3 is jammed to be missing, the parking curves in Fig. 18
show the erroneous parking position is 6.65 m away from the
station platform, and the “stop” deceleration is −0.695 m/s2
when the train speed is 0. Obviously, this attack is so successful
that the train has to be re-started after “stop” in order to transfer
the passengers to the destination station.
Furthermore, we carried on a simulation to jam two balises
B2 and B3, the parking error is up to 9.46 m. This result is in
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Fig. 18. Parking curves with jammed balise B3.
concert with our intuition: The more the balises are jammed, the
higher the parking error is.
C. Balise Displacement Attack
As introduced in Section IV-C, a displacement attack blocks
a balise and then replays its telegram at a target position so as
to control the deceleration update.
Fig. 19 shows the attack effect of different displacement,
where the displacement is evaluated with displaced distance.
When the attacked balise is closer to the platform, the attack
effect is higher.
D. Transmission Extension Attack
In this attack, when a train is around a balise, the number of
received telegrams is increased by extending the telepowering
time or telegram replaying time. According to Section IV-D,
the train will obtain a wrong balise passage time, and/or an
erroneous balise position.
According to the introduction of balise in Section II-B, as-
sume the length of balise telegram is 341-bit, the average bitrate
is br = 564.48 kbps [17]. Thus a telegram transmission time is
Tx = 341/(564.48 × 103) ≈ 6 × 10−4 s. When the extension
time is 6 m × 10−4 seconds for m replayed telegrams, the po-
sition error can be estimated with (26) (or (28)) if the effective
Fig. 19. Parking error vs the displacement of balise B3.
Fig. 20. Parking errors due to extended time for transmitting the telegram of
the balises B5, B3 and B2. Negative attack time ( x-coordinate) means that the
attack is started before the train passes over the balise, i.e., ahead of time.
range R is known, or (27) (or (29)) when the train speed function
v(t) is known.
As an illustrative example, the balises are attacked by ex-
tending its telegram transmission time. Fig. 20 shows the attack
effect. When the attacker replays the telegram of balise B2 or B3
before the train passes over the balise (i.e., ahead of schedule),
the attack works well. Nonetheless, if he replays the telegram
after the train passes over the balise B5 (i.e., behind schedule),
the parking error is small. The reason is as follows. When the
attacker launches time extension attack on balise B2 or B3 for
some time, he induces larger displacement if the attack time
is ahead of schedule as the train moves fast. With reference to
Fig. 19, larger displacement will result in higher parking error.
However, when an attacker performs the attack experiments
on the balise B5, the attack effect are different. As the train speed
is almost constant when the train is localized around the balise
B5, i.e., the displacement distance is almost the same whether
the attack time is ahead of schedule or behind schedule. But
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Fig. 21. Parking error vs. PID parameter. (a) No attack, (b) Balise B3
displacement is 2 meters.
the train has only a short time to control the parking distance if
the attack time is behind schedule, therefore the parking error is
higher.
E. Parameter Sensitivity Analysis
As the controller is in the closed-loop system, its parameters
will impact the system response. Naturally, the parameters will
also impact the attack performance. With reference to Fig. 21(a),
when there is no attack, we adjust the PID controller parame-
ters (kP , kI , kD ) from −50% to 50% one by one. When the
PID parameters become larger, parking accuracy becomes bet-
ter. However, large PID parameters do not significantly reduce
parking errors. However, as shown in Fig. 21(b), if we displace
balise B3 2 meters away, small integral parameter kI or large
proportional parameter kP will the weaken the displacement
attack. Hence, large proportional parameter is able to reduce the
parking no matter whether the displacement attack is started.
In other words, large proportional parameter kP is preferable.
Nonetheless, large proportional parameter may result in high
jerk rate. For example, if the proportional parameter is 4 times
the original one in [60], the parking error is decreased to 0.76
m from 3.32 m, but the jerk rate value will be increased to
0.918 m/s3 from 0.724 m/s3 when the Balise B3 displacement
is 2 meters. Hence, considering the restrictions on parking error
(0.3 m) and jerk rate (0.75 m/s3), it is difficult to defeat the
attacks by tuning the PID parameters.
In the above simulations, we assume that Smith predictor
knows the system delay τ exactly. In practice, this assumption
Fig. 22. Parking error vs. Smith predictor parameter. In the attack case, balise
B3 displacement is 2 meters.
Fig. 23. Parking error vs. train braking parameter. In the attack case, balise
B3 displacement is 2 meters.
does not hold. Fig. 22 indicates that the change of parking error
is small when Smith predictor parameter error varies within
[−10%τ, 10%τ ] whether there is displacement attack or not.
However, if the parameter error is large, the parking error will
increase abruptly.
Furthermore, we performed simulations on the change of train
braking parameter q. As shown in Fig. 23, the train time param-
eter does not have significant effect on the attack performance.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Train automatic stop control is very important in ensuring
accurate and friendly parking on subway station platforms. In-
accurate parking will cause great inconvenience to passengers,
especially in those platforms installed with screen doors, while
unfriendly parking such as emergency stop with high jerk rate
may make passengers fall and even cause injury. However, as the
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rail curvature and slope have impact on the station stop distance,
the parking pattern varies with the stations, and can not be fixed.
In the current subway system, the balise/transponder commu-
nication subsystem plays a crucial role in offering accurate and
friendly parking on stations. However, it is lack of cryptographic
protection such that the train accepts any format-compliant
balise telegram without any security verification. Thus, for the
sake of security and safety, the BTM-balise communication pro-
tection needs to be improved.
This paper proposed three attacks to violate the parking re-
quirements on accuracy and comfortability. By simply disturb-
ing the BTM-balise channel, an attacker forces the train to obtain
an erroneous balise location which is used in the parking control.
As the attacks merely exploit the wireless property and do not
require to tamper with the balise, they can be launched easily.
The simulations demonstrated the effectiveness of the attacks.
Additionally, four countermeasures were presented to defeat the
attacks.
Due to the lack of access to subway infrastructure, we were
not able to perform real attack experiments on the balises.
Nonetheless, the simulation was based on a real subway line con-
figuration and we hope that our results have shed some light on
the importance of security and safety of public infrastructures.
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